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Abstract. On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utility are not empirically meaningful 
and "hence" impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws on the parallels between the problem of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguistic meaning, as explored by Quine. The paper 
discusses several cases of what the empirical evidence for interpersonal comparisons of utility might be and shows 
that, even on the strongest of these, interpersonal comparisons are empirically underdetermined and, if we also deny 
any appropriate truth of the matter, indeterminate. However, the underdetermination can be broken non-arbitrarily 
(though not purely empirically) if (i) we assign normative significance to certain states of affairs or (ii) we posit a 
fixed connection between certain empirically observable proxies and utility. It is concluded that, even if interpersonal 
comparisons are not empirically meaningful, they are not in principle impossible. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The present paper is concerned with our basis for making interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
Utility can be, and has been, interpreted in many different ways. The present argument applies to 
any conception of utility that has the following properties: (i) utility captures some form of 
welfare; (ii) utility is something that we attribute to a person; (iii) utility can be experienced (if at 
all) only from a first-person perspective; and (iv) utility may surface observably in the form of a 
person’s choice behaviour and/or other observable proxies.1 
  
Examples of interpersonal comparisons of utility are statements of the form "Person i's utility in 
state x is at least as great as person j's utility in state y" (an interpersonal comparison of utility 
levels) or of the form "If we switch from state x to state y, the ratio of person i's utility gain/loss to 
person j's utility gain/loss is λ", where λ is some real number (an interpersonal comparison of 
utility units). Below a third type of interpersonal comparison will be added (a utility comparison 
with respect to an interpersonally significant zero-line). 
 
There are many situations in everyday life in which we make (what look like) interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. We often attribute certain utility levels or utility gains or losses to people 
and compare these across different people. Interpersonal comparisons seem to play a great role in 
many choice situations, especially when several people are affected by a decision. We make 
choices to switch from x (e.g. "cooking Marmite paté") to y (e.g. "cooking Chocolate crépes") on 
the basis of whether we believe this switch incurs an immense utility gain for person i (e.g. 
"someone socialized in a Marmite-free part of the world and who finds Marmite revolting") that 
far exceeds a concurrent very moderate utility loss for person j (e.g. "a British Marmite 
connoisseur"). What exactly is captured by such attributions of utility is of course far from clear. 
 
                                                          
1 Although this characterization of utility is deliberately left relatively open, so as to apply to a class of conceptions 
of utility, it is important to note that not all conceptions of utility fall into it. Even amongst those conceptions of 
utility satisfying (i), there is a great range of diversity. Elster and Roemer (1991, introduction) identify two 
dimensions that characterize different conceptions of utility (they actually address “well-being”) that may lend 
themselves to interpersonal comparisons. On one dimension (call it the subjective-objective dimension), conceptions 
are divided into (a) subjective mental states (hedonic satisfaction), (b) degree of objective satisfaction of subjective 
desires, and (c) objective states. On a second dimension (call it the relevance-irrelevance dimension), conceptions 
are characterized by the criteria by which states of pleasure or desire-satisfaction are admitted or rejected as 
admissible components of utility. The present argument aims to be neutral with regard to the second dimension. With 
regard to the first, however, the present argument applies only to conceptions of type (a), as only those have 
properties (ii), (iii) and (iv).  
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The orthodox view in economics is that interpersonal comparisons of utility are not empirically 
meaningful. Robbins (1932) famously argued that "[i]ntrospection does not enable A to measure 
what is going on in B's mind, nor B to measure what is going on in A's. There is no way of 
comparing the satisfactions of two different people" (p. 140). And Arrow's seminal contribution 
to social choice theory is premised upon the view "that interpersonal comparison of utilities has 
no meaning and, in fact, that there is no meaning relevant to welfare comparisons in the 
measurability of individual utility" (Arrow, 1951/1963, p. 9). Although the discrepancy between 
this view and the ease with which we make (what look like) interpersonal comparisons in 
everyday life has been a continuing source of philosophical puzzlement, the orthodox view (or 
more refined versions of it) is strikingly persistent. Recently, Hausman (1995), for instance, 
argued that interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible unless utility is interpreted as 
preference satisfaction.2  
 
These arguments raise at least two different questions, which are sometimes confused with each 
other. First, are interpersonal comparisons of utility empirically meaningful, which we will take 
to mean: are they determined, in a relevant sense (to be spelled out below), by empirical 
evidence? Second, are interpersonal comparisons of utility possible? In particular, if they are not 
empirically meaningful in the sense of being determined by empirical evidence, are they 
meaningful in some other relevant sense (also to be spelled out below)? 
 
It is often assumed that a negative answer to the first question (as given by the orthodox view on 
interpersonal comparisons) entails a negative answer to the second; in short, if interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are not determined by empirical evidence, then they are impossible. Such 
impossibility conclusions cannot be ignored. The question of whether or not interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are considered possible has far-reaching implications for utilitarian theories 
of justice and for welfare economics.  
 
Arrow's impossibility theorem (1951/1963) confirms the intuition that interpersonal comparisons 
of utility are of crucial importance to the solubility of certain collective decision problems: 
Arrow's theorem shows that, if the effects of outcomes on persons are specified only in terms of 
interpersonally-non-comparable (ordinal) utility (or some other interpersonally-non-comparable 
                                                          
2 If utility is interpreted as preference satisfaction, on Hausman's account, identifying the level of satisfaction for 
each person's top preference with 1 and for each person's bottom preference with 0 is warranted. Arguably, the 
conception of utility as preference satisfaction is a conception of type (b) on the subjective-objective dimension 
introduced in note 1 above. Hausman also holds that the interpretation of utility as preference satisfaction does not 
provide the kind of morally relevant notion of utility that is required by utilitarian welfare economics. 
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welfare evaluation standard), there exists no procedure for aggregating such individual utility 
information into overall collective preference orderings or collective choices in accordance with a 
arguably undemanding set of minimal conditions (to be stated below). If, on the other hand, the 
effects of outcomes on persons are specified in terms of interpersonally comparable utility (or 
some other interpersonally comparable welfare evaluation standard), Arrow's impossibility 
theorem no longer applies, and there are aggregation procedures satisfying Arrow's minimal 
conditions (see, amongst many others, Sen, 1970/1979, d’Aspremont, 1985).3 These results will 
be briefly reviewed in section 4 below. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to reassess the status of interpersonal comparisons of utility. The 
paper draws on the parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the 
problem of translation of linguistic meaning, as explored by Quine (1960, 1970).4 I argue that we 
can reconcile the main insight underlying the orthodox view on interpersonal comparisons – 
namely that interpersonal comparisons of utility are empirically underdetermined – with an 
account of how interpersonal comparisons are nonetheless possible. I suggest that the empirical 
underdetermination between different (and, when it comes to interpersonal comparisons, 
mutually incompatible), yet equally empirically adequate rival attributions of utilities to persons 
can be broken non-arbitrarily in a way similar to the way in which the empirical 
underdetermination between mutually incompatible, yet equally empirically adequate rival 
attributions of meanings to different speakers is broken by long-standing linguistic conventions. 
A crucial insight in the context of translation is that indeterminacy of translation does not imply 
impossibility of translation. 
 
The realization that underdetermination, or even indeterminacy, does not imply impossibility then 
tames the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility. The main insight underlying the 
orthodox view on interpersonal utility comparisons – namely that such comparisons are 
empirically underdetermined – remains correct, but its implications turn out to be far less 
negative than commonly assumed. A negative answer to the first of the two questions raised 
                                                          
3 To pursue this escape-route from Arrow's impossibility theorem successfully we must either defend interpersonal 
comparisons of utility, or settle for a welfare-relevant evaluation standard different from utility that is interpersonally 
comparable, such as an index of Rawlsian primary goods or a suitable index of Sen's functionings and capabilities. 
Moreover, it should be obvious that the question of whether interpersonal comparisons are meaningful in a given 
sense depends on what evaluation standard we choose to compare: interpersonal comparisons of monetary income 
are unproblematic (leaving practical issues aside), but maybe not morally relevant, and interpersonal comparisons of 
the amount of health care or education a person has access to are also unproblematic (again leaving practical issues 
aside), and maybe more morally relevant in certain contexts. The present paper, however, is not committed to any 
specific view on the question of which evaluation standards are morally relevant and why this is so. 
4 Davidson (1974, 1986) hinted at these parallels without developing them in detail. 
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above (are interpersonal comparisons of utility empirically meaningful?) does not force us into a 
negative answer to the second one (are interpersonal comparisons of utility possible?). 
 
2. Underdetermination and Indeterminacy 
 
To introduce the concepts of underdetermination and indeterminacy, I will follow the traditional 
syntactic approach to theories. Both a theory and a set of empirical observations will be 
represented as a set of sentences of a formal language. Given a set of empirical observations Φ, a 
theory T is said to be adequate with respect to Φ if T implies the sentences in Φ. In other words, a 
theory is adequate with respect to a given set of observation sentences if these observation 
sentences are amongst the ones the theory would have led us to expect, i.e. if they are amongst 
the implications of the theory. Thus the basic logical relation between theory and empirical 
observations is a relation of one-way implication. A theory, so long as it is adequate, implies the 
empirical observations, but the empirical observations do not necessarily imply the theory. A 
theory T (or a specific theoretical statement τ) is said to be determined by a set of observation 
sentences Φ if Φ implies T (or τ). A theory T (or a specific theoretical statement τ) is said to be 
underdetermined by Φ if T (or τ) is consistent with, but not determined by, Φ. If T (or τ) is 
underdetermined by Φ, then there exists an alternative theory T' (or alternative theoretical 
statement τ') such that T' (or τ') is also consistent with Φ, but T and T' (τ and τ') are mutually 
inconsistent. 
 
Underdetermination, thus, is a purely logical concept. Indeterminacy, by contrast, is a 
metaphysical concept stronger than underdetermination. Given a set of alternative theories and a 
set of observation sentences Φ, we are faced with a situation of indeterminacy if each of the given 
alternative theories is underdetermined by Φ and there exists no independent fact of the matter as 
to which of the alternative theories is the ‘true’ or ‘correct’ one (for a more detailed account of 
the relation between underdetermination, indeterminacy and facts of the matter, see Gibson, 
1986).5 
 
                                                          
5 On Quine's account, physical theories are underdetermined by the totality of observable evidence without being 
indeterminate, while translation is indeterminate, in so far as translation schemes are underdetermined by the totality 
of relevant observable linguistic behaviour and there is no independent fact of the matter as to which of multiple rival 
adequate translation schemes is the ‘true’ one.  
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3. Profiles of Utility Functions and Interpersonal Comparisons 
 
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a set of persons, and let X = {x, y, x1, x2, y1, y2, ...} be a set of options or 
states of affairs (for simplicity, we assume that X is finite or denumerable). A profile of utility 
functions {ui}i∈N is an assignment of one utility function ui : X → R to each person i∈N. For each 
x∈X, ui(x) is interpreted as the utility experienced by person i in response to option x. 
 
An interpersonal comparison of utility levels is a statement of the form "Person i's utility in state 
x is at least as great as person j's utility in state y", formally   
 
(LC)  ui(x) ≥ uj(y), where i, j∈N, x, y∈X, i≠j; 
 
and an interpersonal comparison of utility units is a statement of the form "If we switch from 
state x to state y, the ratio of [person i's utility gain/loss if we switch from y1 to x1] to [person j's 
utility gain/loss if we switch from y2 to x2] is λ", where λ is some real number, formally 
 
  ui(x1) - ui(y1) 
(UC)  = λ, where i, j∈N, x1, y1, x2, y2∈X, i≠j, uj(x2) ≠ uj(y2) and λ∈R. 
    uj(x2) - uj(y2) 
 
We will add to these two commonly discussed types of interpersonal comparisons a third, less 
commonly acknowledged one. A utility comparison with respect to an interpersonally significant 
zero-line is a statement of the form "Person i's utility in state x is greater than/equal to/less than a 
utility level of zero", formally 
 
(ZC) sign(ui(x)) = δ, where i ∈N, x ∈X and δ∈{-1, 0, 1}, 
 
where the sign-function is a function sign : R → {-1, 0, 1} with the property that, for all t∈R, 
sign(t) = -1 if t<0, sign(t) = 0 if t=0, and sign(t) = 1 if t>0. 
 
(ZC)-statements are meaningful only if a utility level of zero can be shown to be a meaningful 
concept. A utility level of zero would somehow have to capture the 'dividing line' between 'utility' 
and 'disutility' or, maybe, between 'pleasure' and 'pain'. Although (ZC)-statements make explicit 
reference only to one person, they can be interpreted as a form of interpersonal comparisons in so 
far as they enable us to make comparisons of utility levels between persons in situations with 
utility level greater than zero, persons in situations with utility level precisely equal to zero, and 
persons in situations with utility level less than zero. 
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Once we have attributed a profile of utility functions {ui}i∈N to the persons in N, we can make 
(LC)-, (UC)- and (ZC)- statements relative to that profile. However, whether these statements can 
be considered meaningful depends on how unique the profile {ui}i∈N is. Suppose, for instance, 
that each utility function ui is unique only up to positive monotonic transformations.6 In other 
words, suppose that we consider the profiles {ui}i∈N and {u*i}i∈N to be informationally equivalent 
whenever, for each i, u*i = φi(ui), where φ1, φ2, ..., φn are positive monotonic transformations, 
possibly different ones for different persons i. This assumption about how unique a profile of 
utility functions is (stated in terms of the conditions under which two profiles of utility functions 
are informationally equivalent) is called ordinal measurability, no interpersonal comparability of 
levels or units (ONC). (LC)-, (UC)- and (ZC)-statements are not in general invariant under the 
transformations specified by (ONC). Hence they are not considered meaningful, because they are 
not independent of which specific profile we select as a representative from amongst a large class 
of informationally equivalent profiles. We will say that interpersonal comparisons, in the form of 
(UC)-, (LC)- or (ZC)-statements, are meaningful only if they are invariant under the class of 
transformations up to which {ui}i∈N is unique. 
                                                          
6 A positive monotonic transformation is a function φ : R → R with the property that, for any s, t∈R, s<t implies 
φ(s)< φ(t). A positive affine transformation is a function φ : R → R with the property that there exist a, b∈R (b>0) 
such that, for all t∈R, φ(t) = a + bt. A positive linear transformation is a function φ : R → R with the property that 
there exists b∈R (b>0) such that, for all t∈R, φ(t) = bt. 
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Condition: The profiles {ui}i∈N and {u*i}i∈N are 
informationally equivalent  if ... 
(LC)-
statements 
(UC)- 
statements 
(ZC)-
statements 
(ONC):  
Ordinal  Measurability,  
No Interpersonal  
Comparability of Levels or 
Units 
... for each i, u*i = φi(ui),  
where φ1, φ2, ..., φn : R → R are positive 
monotonic transformations 
not 
invariant 
not 
invariant 
not 
invariant 
(ONC+0):  
Ordinal  Measurability 
with an Interpersonally 
Significant Zero-Line,  
No Interpersonal  
Comparability of Levels or 
Unity 
... for each i, u*i = φi(ui),  
where φ1, φ2, ..., φn : R → R are positive 
monotonic and sign-preserving  
transformations 
not 
invariant 
not 
invariant 
invariant 
(CNC): 
Cardinal Measurability, 
No Interpersonal 
Comparability of Levels or 
Units 
... for each i, u*i = φi(ui),  
where φ1, φ2, ..., φn : R → R are positive 
affine transformations 
not 
invariant 
not 
invariant 
not 
invariant 
(RNC): 
Ratio-Scale Measurability, 
No Interpersonal 
Comparability of Levels or 
Units 
... for each i, u*i = φi(ui),  
where φ1, φ2, ..., φn : R → R are positive 
linear transformations 
not 
invariant 
not 
invariant 
invariant 
(OLC): 
Ordinal Measurability, 
Interpersonal 
Comparability of Levels 
... for each i, u*i = φ(ui),  
where φ : R → R is a positive monotonic 
transformation 
invariant not 
invariant 
not 
invariant 
(CUC): 
Cardinal Measurability, 
Interpersonal 
Comparability of Units 
... for each i, u*i = ai+b*ui,  
where a1, a2, ..., an ∈ R and b∈ R with b>0 
not 
invariant 
invariant not 
invariant 
(CFC): 
Cardinal Measurability, 
Interpersonal 
Comparability of Levels 
and Units 
... for each i, u*i = φ(ui),  
where φ : R → R is a positive affine 
transformation 
invariant invariant not 
invariant 
(RFC): 
Ratio-Scale Measurability, 
Interpersonal 
Comparability of Levels 
and Units 
... for each i, u*i = φ(ui),  
where φ : R → R is a positive linear 
transformation 
invariant invariant invariant 
The first column states the name of the measurability and interpersonal comparability condition; the second column 
gives a definition of that condition in terms of the conditions under which two profiles of utility functions are 
considered to be informationally equivalent. The third, fourth and fifth column state whether, under the given 
measurability and interpersonal comparability condition, (LC)-, (UC)-, and (ZC)-statements are invariant under all 
admissible transformations of the profiles. 
Table 1 
 
Table 1 shows the relation between different classes of transformations and the invariance (or 
lack thereof) of (UC)-, (LC)- or (ZC)-statements under these transformations (a survey of 
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different informational assumptions about measurability and interpersonal comparability and their 
social-choice-theoretic implications can be found in d’Aspremont, 1985).7 
 
In section 4, I will briefly review the implications of interpersonal comparability of utility for 
Arrow's impossibility theorem (for a detailed discussion of Arrow’s theorem and the implications 
of interpersonal comparability of utility, see Bossert and Weymark, 1996). However, the main 
argument of the paper can still be followed if section 4 is skipped. 
 
4. Interpersonal Comparisons and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem 
 
A social welfare functional (SWFL) is a function F that aggregates each profile {ui}i∈N in a given 
domain into a collective preference ordering R on the set X, where R is reflexive, connected and 
transitive. xRy is interpreted to mean "x is collectively at least as good as y". R also induces a 
strong ordering on X, defined by, for all x, y∈X, xPy if and only if xRy and not yRx. Moreover, it 
is required that F should map informationally equivalent profiles to the same collective 
preference ordering, i.e. F({ui}i∈N) = F({u*i}i∈N) whenever {ui}i∈N and {u*i}i∈N are 
informationally equivalent.  
 
The problem addressed by Arrow's theorem is whether there exists SWFLs, F, that satisfies some 
minimal conditions. Arrow’s conditions are the following: 
 
UNIVERSAL DOMAIN (U). The domain of F is the set of all logically possible profiles of utility 
functions. 
 
Condition (U) is the requirement that any logically possible profile of utility functions be 
admissible as input to the aggregation.  
 
WEAK PARETO PRINCIPLE (P). Let {ui}i∈N be any profile in the domain of F, and let R = 
F({ui}i∈N). For any x1, x2∈X, we have x1Px2 whenever, for all i∈N, ui(x1)>ui(x2). 
 
Condition (P) is the requirement that, if all individuals have a greater utility under x1 than under 
x2, then x1 should be collectively preferred to x2. 
                                                          
7 Table 1 focuses on the implications of the choice of a specific class of transformation for the question of whether 
(UC)-, (LC)- or (ZC)-statements are invariant under these transformations (and thus “meaningful”). For a more 
detailed discussion of the logical relation between meaningful statements and classes of admissible transformations, 
see Bossert and Weymark (1996, section 5). 
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INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES (I). Let {ui}i∈N and {u*i}i∈N be any profiles in 
the domain of F, and let R = F({ui}i∈N) and R* = F({u*i}i∈N). For any x1, x2∈X, if, for all i∈N, 
ui(x1) = u*i(x1) and ui(x2) = u*i(x2), x1Rx2 if and only if x1R*x2. 
 
Condition (I) is the requirement that the collective ranking of any pair of alternatives should 
depend exclusively on the values of the individual utility functions for that pair of alternatives. 
 
NON-DICTATORSHIP (D). F is not dictatorial: there does not exist an i∈N such that, for all {ui}i∈N 
in the domain of F and any x1, x2∈X, ui(x1)>ui(x2) implies x1Px2, where R = F({ui}i∈N). 
 
Condition (D) is the requirement that there should not be one individual, a dictator, whose utility 
function (except possibly in cases of indifference) always determines the collective preference. 
 
Arrow's impossibility theorem states that, given (ONC), there exists no SWFL satisfying these 
four conditions simultaneously (Arrow, 1951/1963; Sen 1970/1979): 
 
Theorem 1. Given (ONC), there exists no SWFL F satisfying (U), (P), (I) and (D).
 
It is also known that, for suitable other measurability and interpersonal comparability conditions, 
there exist SWFLs satisfying (U), (P), (I) and (D). Table 2 shows the logical implications of the 
conditions listed in table 1 for the existence or non-existence of SWFLs satisfying Arrow's 
minimal conditions (with regard to the entries of the right-most column, see, amongst many 
others, Sen, 1970/1979, d’Aspremont, 1985, and List, 2001). 
 
 
Which types of statements are invariant under the class of 
transformations up to which a profile of utility functions is unique?
Condition: 
(LC)-statements (UC)-statements (ZC)-statements 
Do there exist 
SWFLs satisfying 
(U), (P), (I) and (D)? 
(ONC) no no no no 
(ONC+0) no no yes yes 
(CNC) no no no no 
(RNC) no no  yes yes 
(OLC) yes no no yes 
(CUC) no yes no yes 
(CFC) yes yes no yes 
(RFC) yes yes yes yes 
Table 2 
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We observe that (given a choice between the alternative conditions listed in table 1) there exist 
SWFLs satisfying Arrow's minimal conditions if and only if at least one of the three identified 
types of interpersonal comparisons ((LC)-, (UC)- or (ZC)-statements) are meaningful, i.e. 
invariant under the class of transformations up to which a profile of utility functions is unique. 
Viewed in this light, the meaningfulness of interpersonal comparisons of utility is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the existence of aggregation procedures satisfying all of Arrow's minimal 
conditions simultaneously. 
 
5. The Parallel between Translation of Meaning and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility 
 
To identify a parallel between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the 
problem of translation of meaning, as explored by Quine (1960), it is useful to recall the 
characterization of utility given in section 1 and to compare it with Quine’s conception of 
meaning.8 Utility and meaning obviously differ with respect to property (i): utility does, whereas 
meaning does not, capture some form of welfare. But with respect to property (ii), both utility and 
meaning are something we attribute to a person. With respect to property (iii), both utility and 
meaning are something that can be experienced (if at all) only from a first-person perspective, 
although Quine himself, as a behaviourist, might be reluctant to speak of experiencing meaning. 
Finally, with regard to property (iv), both utility and meaning surface observably in the form of 
certain behavioural and/or other observable proxies.  
 
Translation involves the attribution of linguistic meanings to different speakers (property (ii)). 
Suppose I observe that a speaker of a different language assents to the observation sentence 
"Gavagai!" in precisely the same empirical conditions in which I assent to the English 
observation sentence "Rabbit!". Or suppose I observe that another speaker of English assents to 
the sentence "Rabbit!" in precisely the same empirical conditions in which I assent to this 
sentence. Then I am inclined to infer that the sentences "Gavagai!" for the foreign language 
speaker, "Rabbit!" for the other English speaker, and "Rabbit!" for me all have the same meaning. 
On Quine's account, our sole basis for making such judgments of interpersonal sameness of 
meaning lies in our empirical observations of people's linguistic behaviour (property (iv)), since 
                                                          
8 The present argument does not depend on the defensibility of Quine’s theory of language and its underlying 
assumptions. Indeed, much of modern linguistics has departed from Quine’s account (e.g. Chomsky, 1969). Rather, 
given the parallels between the structure of Quine’s conception of meaning and the structure of the conceptions of 
utility addressed here, the present argument seeks to draw on Quine’s insights on what the implications of this 
structure are. This is independent from the question of whether an account of language or utility based on this 
structure is defensible. 
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we have no introspective first-person access to other persons’ minds (property (iii)). According to 
Quine's famous indeterminacy of translation thesis, even the totality of empirical evidence about 
a person's linguistic behaviour underdetermines the attribution of meanings to that person. Given 
suitable adjustments in the translation of other sentences, the rival hypotheses that "Gavagai!" for 
the foreign language speaker (or "Rabbit!" for the other English speaker) means "Undetached 
rabbit part!" or "Temporal rabbit stage!" rather than "Rabbit!" are equally compatible with our 
empirical observations of the foreign speaker's (or the other English speaker's) linguistic 
behaviour. Which translation of “Gavagai!” we adopt has potentially far-reaching repercussions 
for the translation of more theoretical sentences.9 Although the non-standard translations seem 
less parsimonious from the perspective of our own English language, there is, on Quine's account, 
not even in principle any evidence that would break the underdetermination between different 
such rival translations. And since Quine rejects the methodological acceptability of positing any 
in principle inaccessible facts of the matter, Quine's conclusion is that translation and, more 
generally, judgments of interpersonal sameness of meaning are indeterminate. 
 
Similarly, the utilities experienced by another person are not directly observable by us (property 
(iii)). Rather, we can only observe the behaviour of this person (property (iv)), including their 
choice behaviour and their verbal expressions, and possibly other physiological proxies for 
utility, ranging from the person’s facial expressions on the folk-psychological side to a 
measurement of their neural activity on the high-tech-psychological side. Like the attribution of 
meanings to a speaker on the basis of this speaker's linguistic behaviour, the attribution of utility 
to a person (property (ii)) involves theorizing on the basis of whatever evidence about this person 
is accessible from an external third-person perspective. Therefore, in making interpersonal 
comparisons of utility, we must rely on whatever attribution of utilities to the relevant persons 
most adequately covers the available empirical evidence, given certain background assumptions 
about how utility surfaces in observable ways. The argument that even the totality of such 
evidence underdetermines interpersonal comparisons of utility can be summarized succinctly in 
the words of Jevons (1911, p. 14): "The susceptibility of one mind may, for what we know, be a 
thousand times greater than that of another. But, provided that the susceptibility was different in a 
                                                          
9 Strictly speaking (and as Quine himself points out), the "Gavagai!"-example by itself illustrates only indeterminacy 
of reference, not indeterminacy of translation. Indeterminacy of translation requires that there exist sentences which 
can be adequately translated not only in two or more different ways (like the sentence "Gavagai!"), but also in 
logically incompatible ways (unlike the sentence "Gavagai!", whose rival translations are different, but not logically 
incompatible (in Quine's terms, they are in fact holophrastically equivalent). The arguments of the present paper, 
however, are not dependent on the indeterminacy of translation thesis. The present analysis of the problem of 
interpersonal comparisons of utility can equally be developed on the basis of a parallel between the problem of 
attributing utility and the problem of attributing reference. 
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like ratio in all directions, we should never be able to discover the difference. Every mind is thus 
inscrutable to every other mind, and no common denominator of feeling seems to be possible ... 
the motive in one mind is weighed only against other motives in the same mind, never against the 
motives in other minds." As in the case of translation, if all relevant observable behaviour and, 
possibly, other relevant observable physiological responses of two persons are identical, then we 
are at first sight inclined to attribute identical utilities to these persons. But, if Jevons's argument 
is correct, the rival hypothesis that one of the two persons, the 'utility monster', is one thousand 
times more susceptible to pleasure and pain than the other, while apparently less parsimonious, is 
equally compatible with all available empirical evidence. If we believe that Jevons's argument is 
correct and that we have not left out any relevant empirical evidence, we are forced to conclude 
that interpersonal comparisons of utility are underdetermined by the totality of empirical 
evidence. If we believe in addition that there is no independent fact of the matter to break the 
underdetermination, we are forced to conclude that interpersonal comparisons of utility are 
indeterminate.  
 
Such, in short, is the parallel between the problem of translation of meaning and the problem of 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. I will now turn to a more detailed discussion of the latter. 
 
6. Attributing Utility to Persons on the Basis of Empirical Evidence 
 
As we have noted, the utilities experienced by the persons in N in response to the options in X 
cannot be directly observed. Like the attribution of meanings to a set of speakers, the attribution 
of utilities to a set of persons involves building a theory on the basis of the available empirical 
evidence. The theory to be built consists of a profile of utility functions {ui}i∈N and some 
auxiliary assumptions about how utility surfaces in observable ways. A typical, but neither trivial 
nor uncontroversial such auxiliary assumption is that, if ui(x)>ui(y), then person i would, under 
normal circumstances, choose x over y. It is only after we have attributed a profile of utility 
functions to the persons in N and specified relevant auxiliary assumptions that we can make 
comparisons between the utilities of different persons. Thus making interpersonal comparisons of 
utility is a two-step process. In a first step, we attribute to the set of persons N a profile of utility 
functions {ui}i∈N such that {ui}i∈N (jointly with the relevant auxiliary assumptions) is adequate 
with respect to the available evidence. In a second step, we then use the attributed profile of 
utility functions to make interpersonal comparisons of utility.  
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Schematically, the logical relation between empirical evidence (box 1), an attributed profile of 
utility functions (box 2) and interpersonal comparisons (box 3) is as follows: 
 
       
      implies 
       
               
           may not 
      imply(?) 
 
            Box 2     implies                 Box 1  
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Box 3 
Table 3 
The relation between box 2 and box 3 is one of logical implication: Given a profile of utility 
functions, we can make (LC)-, (UC)- and (ZC)-statements relative to that profile. This means 
that, if we can be sure that we have filled box 2 'correctly', i.e. that we have found the 'correct' 
profile of utility functions, we will have found a basis for interpersonal comparisons. Or, to be 
more precise, we will have found such a basis if we can be sure that the content of box 2 is 
unique up to a sufficiently small class of transformations for (LC)-, (UC)- or (ZC)-statements to 
be invariant under these transformations. The central question we have to address is therefore 
whether the empirical evidence in box 1 determines the theory in box 2 sufficiently uniquely.  
 
The onus of argument on the proponent of the empirical meaningfulness of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility is to show that the empirical evidence in box 1 determines a profile of 
utility functions in box 2 uniquely up to a sufficiently small class of transformations. The onus of 
argument on the proponent of the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility is slightly 
weaker: the onus is to show that, even if there is no straightforward relation of logical implication 
leading from box 1 to box 2, there are other, possibly non-empirical, considerations over and 
above the evidence in box 1 which enable us to select a profile of utility function in box 2 
uniquely up to a sufficiently small class of transformations. 
 
empirical evidence about the 
persons in N:  
- choice behaviour  
- other observable proxies 
for utility 
theory:  
- a profile of utility functions 
for N,{ui}i∈N  
- auxiliary assumptions 
about how {ui}i∈N surfaces 
in observable ways 
interpersonal comparisons:  
- (LC) Is ui(x) ≥ uj(y)? 
- (UC) What is  
(ui(x1)-ui(y1))/(uj(x2)-uj(y2)) 
? 
- (ZC) What is sign(x)? 
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The rest of section 6 is mainly concerned with the former question about empirical 
meaningfulness, section 7 mainly with the latter one about possibility. In subsection 6.1, I will 
introduce several different cases of what the relevant empirical evidence might be. In subsection 
6.2, I will then explore the implications of the various cases. 
 
6.1. Different Types of Empirical Evidence 
 
I will now present several cases of what the empirical evidence for utility might be. Each of these 
cases represents an idealized limiting case, positing a body of evidence that is richer than what we 
realistically expect to find empirically. This is not harmful in the context of the present argument. 
If we are faced with underdetermination problems even in a utopia of unrealistically rich 
empirical evidence, then, a fortiori, these problems will occur in more realistic circumstances of 
sparse evidence. Indeed, whether any of the types of evidence to be discussed are actually 
evidence for utility is a philosophical question the present paper cannot resolve.10 The formal 
conditions stated in table 4 will be discussed more informally below. The argument can be 
informally followed even if the technical details of table 4 are skipped.  
                                                          
10 As indicated above, interpreting a body of empirical observations as evidence for utility requires certain auxiliary 
assumptions about how utility surfaces in observable ways. Amongst these auxiliary assumptions are relatively 
common ones such as the assumption (mentioned above) that, if ui(x)>ui(y), then person i would, under normal 
circumstances, choose x over y, as well as more contestable ones such as condition (N1 a/b/c) introduced below. 
Whether or not commonly made such assumptions are defensible is left open here. These open questions, however, 
reinforce rather than weaken the central point of the paper, namely that attributing utilities to people on the basis of 
empirical evidence involves a substantial act of theorizing that may suffer from underdetermination and possibly 
indeterminacy problems.  
 16 
 
Ranking Evidence – Options (RankEv).  
The evidence includes all true statements of the form  
- xRiy, where x, y∈X, i∈N and xRiy means "person i weakly prefers x to y" 
satisfying  
(P1)  ("ordering") for each i∈N, Ri is a reflexive, transitive and complete binary relation. 
 
A binary lottery is an option of the form p*x+(1-p)*y, where x, y∈X, p∈[0,1] and p*x+(1-p)*y is means "get either x 
or y with associated probabilities p and 1-p, respectively". Given a set of options X, let L(X) be the set of all binary 
lotteries in X. Note that X⊆L(X), since each x∈X can be interpreted as a binary lottery 1*x+0*x∈L(X). Further, for 
each i∈N, Ri induces a strong ordering Pi, defined as follows: xPiy if and only if xRiy and not yRix. 
 
Ranking Evidence – Options and Binary Lotteries (RankEvLot). 
The evidence includes all true statements of the form 
- xRiy, where x, y∈L(X), i∈N and xRiy means "person i weakly prefers x to y" 
satisfying  
(P1)  ("ordering") for each i∈N, Ri is a reflexive, transitive and complete binary relation on L(X); 
(P2)  ("Archimedean property") for each i∈N and all x, y, z∈X, if xPiy and yPiz, then there exist λ, 
µ∈(0,1) such that (λ*x+(1-λ)*z)Piy and yPi(µ*x+(1-µ)*z); 
(P3) ("independence") for each i∈N, all x, y, z∈X and all λ∈(0,1], xRiy if and only if  
(λ*x+(1-λ)*z)Ri(λ*y+(1-λ)*z). 
 
Additional Proxies for Utility – Case a (Prox-a).  
The evidence includes all true statements of the form 
- fi(x) = λ, where x∈X, i∈N, λ∈R and fi : X → R is some real-valued observable proxy for person i's utility in 
response to options in X 
   satisfying (given that we also have (RankEv)) 
(P4 a)  ("consistency of f-response with preference") there exist a positive monotonic transformation φ : R 
→ R and some profile of utility functions {u*i}i∈N representing {Ri}i∈N (according to theorem 2 
below) such that, for all i∈N and all x, y∈X, fi(x) = φ(u*i(x)). 
 
Additional Proxies for Utility – Case b (Prox-b). 
The evidence includes all true statements of the form 
- gi(x, y) = λ, where x, y∈X, i∈N, λ∈R and gi : X2 → R is some real-valued observable proxy for person i's 
utility in response to differences/switches between options in X  
satisfying (given that we also have (RankEvLot)) 
(P4 b)  ("consistency of g-response with preference") there exist a positive monotonic transformation ψ : R 
→ R and some profile of utility functions {u*i}i∈N representing {Ri}i∈N (according to theorem 3 
below) such that, for all i∈N and all x, y∈X, gi(x, y) = ψ(u*i(x)-u*i(y)). 
 
Additional Proxies for Utility – Case c (Prox-c). 
The evidence includes all true statements of the form 
- hi(x) = δ, where x∈X, i∈N, δ∈{-1,0,1} and fi : X → R is some -1/0/1-valued observable proxy for person i’s 
utility in response to options in X (taking values 1=’positive utility’, 0=‘neutral’, -1=‘negative utility’) 
satisfying (given that we also have (RankEv)) 
(P4 c)  ("consistency of h-response with preference") there exists some profile of utility functions {u*i}i∈N 
representing {Ri}i∈N (according to theorem 2 below) such that, for all i∈N and all x, y∈X, hi(x) = 
sign(u*i(x)). 
 
Table 4 
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In terms of the conditions stated in table 4, we will consider the following cases.  
 
Case 1: We have (RankEv). 
Each person's utility surfaces only in the form of this person's revealed preference ordering Ri 
over the options in X. That is, given an apple, an orange and a banana, for instance, we can 
determine each person's preference ordering over these three fruits. 
 
Case 2: We have (RankEvLot). 
Each person's utility surfaces only in the form of this person's revealed preference ordering Ri 
over all options and binary lotteries in X. That is, we can determine, for instance, not only that a 
person prefers an orange to a banana to an apple, but also whether or not, for any given 
probability p, the person would prefer a guaranteed banana to a lottery whose prize would be 
either an orange or an apple with associated probabilities p and 1-p, respectively. 
 
Case 3a: We have (RankEv) and (Prox-a).  
Case 3b: We have (RankEvLot) and (Prox-b). 
Case 3c: We have (RankEv) and (Prox-c).  
(“utopian best case scenarios”) Each person's utility surfaces in the form of this person's revealed 
preference ordering Ri over all options (and, in case 3b, all binary lotteries) in X and also in the 
form of some other observable proxies for this person's utility, formalized here by the functions fi, 
gi or hi.11 These proxy functions could measure such characteristics as a person's observable facial 
expression of pleasure or pain, a person's verbal expressions, a person's heartbeat or body 
temperature, a person's relevant neural activity, in response to the options (in case 3a, real-valued; 
in case 3c, -1/0/1-valued) or in response to switches between options (in case 3b, also real-
valued). Or they could measure a person's spontaneity of choosing one option over another in a 
forced-choice situation (also in case 3b) (see Waldner, 1972) (assuming that a greater such 
spontaneity corresponds to a greater utility gain). Or they could measure something else that 
might be thought of as a proxy for a person's utility. I am here making no claims as to whether it 
is realistic to think that such additional observable proxies for utility exist. The point is only to 
                                                          
11 At first sight, the proxy functions fi, gi and hi (particularly fi and gi) may raise similar problems of measurability 
and uniqueness as the utility functions ui themselves. But even if there is no unique privileged scale for measuring fi 
and gi, we will assume that what makes fi and gi observable is that, whatever scale of measurement we choose, this 
scale is a common one for all persons in N. It is thus crucial that fi and gi are unique up to identical transformations 
(say positive affine ones) for every person. The proxies are to be interpreted, using Elster and Roemer’s phrase 
(1991, introduction, p. 10), as “objective proxies for subjective well-being”, not as suggesting an “objective 
conception of well-being”. 
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ask what the logical implications of such a utopian best case scenario for the problem of 
interpersonal comparisons of utility would be. 
  
6.2. Implications 
 
To determine the implications of cases 1, 2 and 3a/b/c for the problem of interpersonal 
comparability, we will use two standard representation theorems. The subsequent argument can 
be informally followed even if the technical details of the theorems are skipped. 
 
Theorem 2. (Debreu, 1954) For each i∈N, the following holds: Given that X is finite or 
denumerable, Ri satisfies (P1) if and only if there exists a utility function ui : X → R such that, for 
all x, y∈X, xRiy if and only if ui(x)≥ui(y). Moreover, if ui has this property, then so does φi(ui), 
where φi : R → R is any positive monotonic transformation. 
 
Theorem 2 states that any preference ordering satisfying condition (P1) in table 4 can be 
represented by a utility function that is unique up to positive monotonic transformations. 
 
Theorem 3. (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) For each i∈N, the following holds: Ri 
satisfies (P1), (P2) and (P3) if and only if there exists a utility function ui : L(X) → R such that (i) 
for all x, y∈X, xRiy if and only if ui(x)≥ui(y) and (ii) for all x, y∈X and all p∈[0,1], ui(p*x+(1-
p)*y)= p*ui(x)+(1-p)*ui(y). Moreover, if ui has this property, then so does φi(ui), where φi : R → 
R is any positive affine transformation. 
 
Theorem 3 states that any preference ordering satisfying conditions (P1), (P2) and (P3) in table 4 
can be represented by a utility function that is unique up to positive affine transformations. 
 
6.2.1. Using Only Ranking Evidence 
 
Cases 1 and 2. 
In case 1, by theorem 2, each person's utility function is determined uniquely only up to positive 
monotonic transformations. In case 2, by theorem 3, each person's utility function is determined 
uniquely only up to positive affine transformations. Thus cases 1 and 2 generate, respectively, 
conditions (ONC) and (CNC) in table 1, and therefore leave (UC)-, (LC)- and (ZC)-statements 
underdetermined.  
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Cases 3a and 3c without (Prox-a/c). 
By theorem 2, if we use only (RankEv) but not (Prox-a/c), each person's utility function is 
determined uniquely only up to positive monotonic transformations. Once again, this is condition 
(ONC) in table 1, which leaves (UC)-, (LC)- and (ZC)-statements underdetermined.  
 
Case 3b without (Prox-b).  
By theorem 3, if we use only (RankEvLot) but not (Prox-b), each person's utility function is 
determined uniquely only up to positive affine transformations. This is condition (CNC) in table 
1, which also leaves (UC)-, (LC)- and (ZC)-statements underdetermined.  
 
If we conclude that (UC)-, (LC)- and (ZC)-statements are underdetermined and we hold in 
addition that there is no independent fact of the matter about what the 'true' interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are, interpersonal comparisons of utility are indeterminate. 
 
6.2.2. Using Additional Proxies for Utility 
 
The situation changes if we use the additional evidence (Prox-a), (Prox-b) or (Prox-c). The 
availability of this additional evidence means that we can use not only the persons' revealed 
preferences, but also the other observable proxies for utility as a potential basis for interpersonal 
comparisons. The conditions (P4 a/b/c) have two implications. First, a utility function we 
attribute to a person on the basis of revealed preferences is consistent with what the other proxy 
functions, fi, gi or hi would lead us to infer about this utility function: fi strictly increases with an 
increase in utility; gi strictly increases with an increase in the utility gain a person experiences as 
a result of a switch from one option to another; hi is weakly monotonic in utility. Second, it is 
possible to choose a profile of utility functions for the persons in such a way (namely {ui}i∈N = 
{u*i}i∈N) that the transformations describing the functional relation between the utility function ui 
and the proxy functions fi, gi or hi (i.e. the transformations describing how utility surfaces in the 
form of the proxy functions fi, gi or hi) are the same for all persons (in cases 3a and 3b, the 
transformation is a positive monotonic transformation; in case 3c, the transformation is the sign-
function).   
 
Now much depends on whether or not we accept the following (non-empirical) conditions: 
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(N1 a)  ("interpersonal sameness of the conversion of utility into the proxy functions")  
There exists a positive monotonic transformation φ : R → R such that, for all i∈N and all 
x, y∈X, fi(x) = φ(ui(x)). 
 
(N1 b) ("interpersonal sameness of the conversion of utility into the proxy functions")  
There exists a positive monotonic transformation ψ : R → R such that, for all i∈N and all 
x, y∈X, gi(x, y) = ψ(ui(x)-ui(y)). 
 
(N1 c) ("interpersonal sameness of the conversion of utility into the proxy functions")  
For all i∈N and all x∈X, hi(x) = sign(ui(x)). 
 
Conditions (N1 a/b/c) state that a profile of utility functions is adequate only if, according to that 
profile, all persons have identical ways of converting utility into the observable proxies fi, gi or hi.  
In cases 3a/b, conditions (N1 a/b) rule out the possibility that different persons exhibit identical fi 
or gi values and yet their underlying utilities are different. In case 3c, condition (N1 c) rules out 
the possibility that different persons exhibit identical hi values and yet they are not in the same 
one of the three states ‘positive utility’, ‘neutral’, ‘negative utility’. We will now see that cases 
3a, 3b and 3c, jointly with conditions (N1 a), (N1 b), (N1 c), generate, respectively, conditions 
(OLC), (CUC) and (ONC+0) in table 1, determining, respectively, (LC)-, (UC)- and (ZC)-
statements.  
 
Case 3a with (Prox-a). 
If we accept condition (N1 a), we are no longer free to apply different positive monotonic 
transformations to the utility functions of different persons without undermining the adequacy of 
the resulting profile. Suppose we apply a positive monotonic transformation to one person’s 
utility function, i.e. for some i∈N, we replace ui with θ(ui), where θ : R → R is a positive 
monotonic transformation. Then we are also forced to replace φ with φ*, where φ is the 
transformation in (N1 a), defining φ* as follows: for all t∈R, φ*(t) = φ(θ -1(t)) (θ -1 is the inverse 
transformation of θ). Consequently, we are forced to replace ui with θ(ui) for every i∈N. Hence a 
profile of utility functions is determined uniquely up to identical positive monotonic 
transformations for every person. This is condition (OLC) in table 1, determining (LC)-
statements. 
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Case 3b with (Prox-b). 
If we accept condition (N1 b), the situation is similar. Suppose we apply a positive affine 
transformation to one person’s utility function, i.e. for some i∈N, we replace ui with ai+bui. Then 
we are also forced to replace ψ with ψ*, where ψ is the transformation in (N1 b), defining ψ* as 
follows: for all t∈R, ψ*(t) = ψ(t/b). Consequently, we are forced to replace ui with ai+bui for 
every i∈N. Note that, while the ai may be different for different persons i, b must be the same for 
all persons. This is condition (CUC) in table 1, determining (UC)-statements. 
 
Case 3c with (Prox-c). 
If we accept condition (N1 c), the only positive monotonic transformations we can apply to each 
ui without undermining the adequacy of the resulting profile are sign-preserving ones. The reason 
is that, if we replace ui with θ(ui), where θ is not sign-preserving, then it may no longer be true 
that, for all x∈X, hi(x) = sign(ui(x)) as required by condition (N1 c). This is condition (ONC+0) in 
table 1, determining (ZC)-statements. 
 
If we do not accept conditions (N1 a/b/c), on the other hand, we are free to apply different 
transformations to the utility functions of different persons. In cases (3 a/b), we then have to 
admit the possibility that different persons exhibit identical fi or gi values and yet their underlying 
utilities are different. In case (3 c), we have to admit the possibility that different persons exhibit 
identical hi values and yet they are not in the same one of the three states ‘positive utility’, 
‘neutral’, ‘negative utility’. For instance, if we multiply person 1's utility function by a factor of 
10 while leaving all other utility functions unchanged, we must also accept that person 1's ‘rate’ 
of converting utility into observable fi or gi values is divided by a factor of 10. If we are prepared 
to make such adjustments (and an opponent of interpersonal comparisons of utility would indeed 
ask, why not?), we are back to the conditions (ONC) or (CNC) in table 1, and (UC)-, (LC)- and 
(ZC)-statements remain underdetermined. Again, if we hold that there is no independent fact of 
the matter about what the 'true' interpersonal comparisons of utility are, interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are indeterminate. 
 
6.2.3. Interpretation 
 
There are at least three different views one might take on the status of conditions (N1 a/b/c). On 
the first (realist) view, conditions (N1 a/b/c) are held to be true in a realist sense: the functional 
relation between the real utilities experienced by the persons and the observable proxies fi, gi or hi 
is the same for all persons. One possible source of this realist position might be the view that 
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utility is systematically reducible to, or in an interpersonally identical way correlated with, certain 
observable physiological states. On such a view, identical physiological states of the relevant kind 
– expressed in terms of the proxy functions fi, gi or hi – indicate identical utilities (or, in the case 
of hi, identical interpersonally significant states ‘positive utility’, ‘neutral’ and ‘negative utility’). 
 
On the second (pragmatic) view, which Davidson (1986) attributes to Harsanyi (1955) and 
Waldner (1972), conditions (N1 a/b/c) are regarded not as stating a truth about real utilities, but 
as a requirement of good scientific methodology: in the absence of any observable differences 
between different persons, it is bad methodology to attribute different utilities (or different 
interpersonally significant states 'pleasure', 'neutral', 'pain') to them; good methodology requires 
us to attribute identical utilities (identical states 'pleasure', 'neutral', 'pain') if the observable 
proxies are identical. Davidson summarizes this view as follows: "[I]t does not make sense to say 
that two people are alike in all relevant observable respects but have different thoughts and 
feelings. Or perhaps it makes sense, but it is bad science." Harsanyi offers the following defence: 
"If two objects or human beings show similar behaviour in all their relevant aspects open to 
observation, the assumption of some unobservable hidden difference between them must be 
regarded as a completely gratuitous hypothesis and one contrary to sound scientific method. ... 
Thus in the case of persons with similar preferences and expressive reactions we are fully entitled 
to assume that they derive the same utilities from similar situations." (Harsanyi, 1955, p. 279) We 
will return to this pragmatic view in section 7.2. 
 
On the third (sceptical) view, instead of "not postulating any differences unless there is some 
reason to do so" (Waldner, 1972, p. 102), it is held that "there is no scientific reason to postulate 
anything at all" (Davidson, 1986, p. 202), and conditions (N1 a/b/c) are therefore rejected.  
 
6.2.4. Summary 
 
Table 5 shows the logical relation between the different types of evidence introduced above, 
conditions (N1 a/b/c) and the conditions listed in table 1. 
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If we have 
(RankEv) (RankEv 
Lot) 
(Prox-a) (Prox-b) (Prox-c) (N1 a) (N1 b) (N1 c) 
Then  
we have 
yes no no or yes no no or yes no no no (ONC) 
yes no no or yes no yes no no yes (ONC+0) 
yes yes no or yes no or yes no or yes no no no (CNC) 
yes yes no or yes no or yes yes no no yes (RNC) 
yes no yes no no or yes yes no no (OLC) 
yes yes no or yes yes no or yes no yes no (CUC) 
yes yes yes no or yes no or yes yes no or yes no (CFC) 
yes yes yes no or yes yes yes no or yes  yes (RFC) 
Table 5 
 
Comparing tables 2 and 5, we observe that those conditions which are sufficient for the existence 
of aggregation procedures satisfying all of Arrow's conditions simultaneously are precisely the 
ones in which at least one of conditions (N1 a/b/c) is accepted. This highlights the significance of 
conditions (N1 a/b/c) not only for the question of whether interpersonal comparisons of utility are 
determined by the available empirical evidence, but also for the solubility of Arrowian collective 
decision problems.  
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7. Yet Another Impossibility Argument? 
 
Schematically, the argument of the present paper can be summarized as follows: 
 
What is the body of empirical evidence? 
 
 
 
 
 
             
             
             
             
         
 
 
         Is there a fact of the matter about                     Are (N1 a/b/c) or some equivalent  
     interpersonal comparisons of utility?   condition true? 
               
    
               
    
 
 
 
      Interpersonal    Interpersonal  
comparisons of utility     comparisons of utility 
 are underdetermined are indeterminate. 
 but not indeterminate. 
                                                                    Interpersonal                   
   comparisons of utility  
            are determined 
         (LC) (3a), (UC) (3b), (ZC) (3c).  
 
        Is there a fact of the matter about 
                                                                                                                       interpersonal comparisons of utility? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     Interpersonal                 Interpersonal 
       comparisons of utility    comparisons of utility 
              are underdetermined         are indeterminate. 
                         but not indeterminate. 
Table 6 
   
preference orderings over 
options (case 1) 
or preference orderings over 
options and binary lotteries 
(case 2) 
preference orderings over 
options (and in case 3b, binary 
lotteries) and other observable 
proxies of utility  
(cases 3 a/b/c)
Yes No No Yes 
No Yes 
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In short, unless we have the rich evidence of cases 3a, 3b or 3c (or, to be more precise, a 
sufficiently large subset of such evidence) and we accept at least one of the corresponding 
conditions (N1 a/b/c) (or some equivalent condition) as true, interpersonal comparisons of utility 
are underdetermined and, if we also believe that there is no independent fact of the matter about 
what the 'true' interpersonal comparisons of utility are, indeterminate. 
 
Is this yet another version of the argument that interpersonal comparisons of utility are 
impossible? Does the present argument not once again make a mystery of the apparent ease with 
which we make (what look like) interpersonal comparisons of utility? 
 
I believe not. Underdetermination and even indeterminacy do not imply impossibility. As Quine 
stresses in the context of translation, there do exist adequate translation schemes. As soon as we 
select one such scheme, questions of interpersonal sameness of meaning have well-defined, 
though translation-scheme-dependent, answers. Quine's point is not that adequate translation is 
impossible. Rather, it is that no adequate translation scheme is determined uniquely by the 
available evidence. The underdetermination between alternative adequate translation schemes can 
be broken only by non-empirical considerations, such as conventions or considerations of 
parsimony.12 In the case of the attribution of meanings to another speaker of my own language, 
for example, the homophonic translation scheme – which translates "Rabbit!" for the other 
English speaker into "Rabbit!" for me –, while empirically underdetermined, seems more 
parsimonious than the non-standard translation scheme which translates "Rabbit!" for the other 
English speaker into "Undetached rabbit part!" for me.  
 
Similarly, to defend the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, even on the view that 
such comparisons are indeterminate, we require an explanation of how the underdetermination 
between rival attributions of utilities to persons can be broken in a non-arbitrary way. I believe 
that the present account points towards at least two possible such explanations, independent from 
each other. The first one, assigning normative significance to certain states of affairs, is 
compatible even with the narrow evidence of cases 1 and 2 above. The second one, positing a 
fixed connection between certain empirically observable 'proxies' and utility, requires the richer 
evidence of cases 3a/b/c. 
 
                                                          
12 When asked why mutually incompatible, yet equally empirically adequate translation schemes never seem to occur 
in practice, Quine responds that the terrain has already been conquered by existing translation schemes and certain 
long-standing conventions. 
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7.1. Assigning Normative Significance to Certain Options or States of Affairs 
 
Given the weak evidence of cases 1 and 2, we cannot use constraints like (N1 a/b/c) for breaking 
the underdetermination between rival attributions of utilities to persons. But suppose that we 
identify some fixed options or states of affairs x0 and/or y0 in X as normatively significant (for 
instance, by interpreting them, respectively, as 'deprivation' and 'saturation' consumption bundles 
of goods/resources) and impose (some of) the following additional conditions on the attribution 
of utilities to persons: 
 
(N2 a) ("options/states x0 and y0 each generate the same utility level for all persons") 
u1(x0) = u2(x0) = ... = un(x0), and u1(y0) = u2(y0) = ... = un(y0). 
 
(N2 b) ("a switch from option/state x0 to option/state y0 generates the same welfare gain/loss for 
 all persons") 
u1(y0)-u1(x0) = u2(y0)-u2(x0) = ... = un(y0)-un(x0), where everyone prefers y0 to x0. 
 
(N2 c) ("option x0 generates the same interpersonally significant norm level of utility for all 
 persons") 
u1(x0) = u2(x0) = ... = un(x0) = α0, where α0 is a fixed real number, in particular α0 = 0. 
 
If we identify a single option x0 (e.g. a 'deprivation' consumption bundle) as normatively 
significant and impose condition (N2 c), then the evidence of case 1 generates condition 
(ONC+0) in table 1, determining (ZC)-statements. This, in turn, is sufficient for the existence of 
aggregation procedures satisfying all of Arrow's conditions simultaneously (List, 2001).  
 
If we identify two distinct options x0 and y0 (e.g. a 'deprivation' consumption bundle and a 
'saturation' consumption bundle, respectively) as normatively significant and impose condition 
(N2 b), then the evidence of case 2 generates condition (CUC) in table 1, determining (UC)-
statements. If we identify two such options x0 and y0 and impose condition (N2 a) (which implies 
(N2 b)), then the evidence of case 2 generates condition (CFC) in table 1, determining both (LC)- 
and (UC)-statements. Either of these cases is sufficient for the existence of aggregation 
procedures satisfying all of Arrow's conditions simultaneously (Sen, 1970/1979). 
 
More generally, the following table shows the logical relation between the types of evidence 
introduced above, conditions (N2 a/b/c) and the condition listed in table 1. 
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If we have 
(RankEv) (RankEvLot) (N2 a) (N2 b) (N2 c) 
Then  
we have 
yes no no no no (ONC) 
yes no no no yes (ONC+0) 
yes yes no no no (CNC) 
yes yes no no yes (RNC) 
not possible to generate here (OLC) 
yes yes no yes no (CUC) 
yes yes yes yes no (CFC) 
yes yes yes yes yes (RFC) 
Table 7 
 
We often make the (normative) assumption that, for sufficiently similar people, similar states of 
affairs (e.g. "two people are both healthy, both have a happy family and many friends, and both 
have a good job, etc.") generate (or should be taken to generate) similar levels of utility.13 Such a 
(normative) assumption is effectively an informal instance of what conditions (N1 a), (N2 b) and 
(N2 c) capture in more formal terms. As we have seen, even if only as few as one or two such 
normatively distinguished options or states of affairs are identified, the underdetermination 
between rival attributions of utilities to persons can be broken – of course, in a non-empirical 
way, but nonetheless, by stipulation, in a normatively significant one. 
 
7.2. Positing a fixed connection between empirically observable proxies and utility 
 
The evidence of cases 3a/b/c may seem unrealistically rich. But, on closer inspection, the 
evidence of cases 1 and 2 may seem unrealistically sparse, and cases 3a/b/c may seem a better 
description of the types of evidence we use when we make (what look like) interpersonal 
comparisons of utility in everyday life. In making such comparisons, we seem to rely on evidence 
over and above people's revealed preference orderings. In particular, we seem to rely on a range 
of behavioural and physiological proxies for utility, such as a person's facial expression and other 
                                                          
13 Conditions (N2 a), (N2 b), (N2 c) can be replaced with the following more refined conditions that allow the 
identification of person-specific normatively significant options/states (thereby acknowledging, for example, the 
possibility that different persons have different 'deprivation' or 'saturation' consumption bundles): 
 
(N2' a) u1(x01) = u2(x02) = ... = un(x0n), and u1(y01) = u2(y02) = ... = un(y0n); 
 
(N2' b)  u1(y01)-u1(x01) = u2(y02)-u2(x02) = ... = un(y0n)-un(x0n),  
where, for each i∈N, person i prefers y0i to x0i; 
 
(N2' c)  u1(x01) = u2(x02) = ... = un(x0n) = α0,  
where α0 is a fixed real number, in particular α0 = 0; 
 
where, for each i∈N, x0i and y0i are the options in X identified as normatively significant for person i. 
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gestures, body language, the sound of a person's voice and a person's verbal self-description of 
his or her level of pleasure or pain. This body of evidence might be seen as an informal instance 
of what cases 3a/b/c describe in an idealized manner.  
 
As soon as we use evidence as described by cases 3a/b/c, there are non-arbitrary ways of breaking 
the underdetermination between rival attributions of utility to a set of persons. Even if we do not 
accept one of conditions (N1 a/b/c) as true in a realist sense, we can adopt what we described as 
the 'pragmatic' view in section 6.2.3 and accept one of conditions (N1 a/b/c) as a principle of 
parsimony. On such a view, conditions (N1 a/b/c) are analogous to the convention in translation 
to give priority to homophonic translation schemes over non-standard translation schemes, 
provided that we have no empirical reason to reject a homophonic translation scheme in favour of 
a non-standard one.  
 
The argument for the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, then, is the following. 
First, we use evidence as described by cases 3a/b/c and, second, so long as empirical adequacy 
permits, we accept conditions (N1 a/b/c) for breaking the underdetermination between rival 
attributions of utility to persons. As we have seen above, cases 3a, 3b or 3c, jointly with 
conditions (N1 a), (N1 b) or (N1 c), respectively, are sufficient not only for determining 
interpersonal comparisons of utility, but also for the existence of aggregation procedures 
satisfying Arrow's minimal conditions. 
 
7.3. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have seen that, even if interpersonal comparisons are not determined by the available 
evidence, the underdetermination can be broken non-arbitrarily (though not purely empirically) if 
(i) we assign normative significance to certain states of affairs or (ii) we posit a fixed connection 
between certain empirically observable 'proxies' and utility.  
 
We can speculate whether the present account of the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of 
utility captures the actual mechanisms by which we make (what look like) interpersonal 
comparisons in everyday life. As suggested above, in everyday life, we may be inclined to 
attribute similar utility levels two different persons for similar options or similar states of affairs, 
so long as these persons are sufficiently similar. This is in essence an instance of (i). If we make 
interpersonal comparisons on the basis of it, the underlying mechanism might be an informal 
instance of the account given in section 7.1. Alternatively, suppose that the evidence we actually 
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use in attributing utilities to persons is richer than the sparse evidence of cases 1 and 2. And 
suppose in particular that we do rely on (more informal versions) of the kinds of proxies 
described by cases 3a/b/c, attributing similar utilities for similar observable proxies. This is in 
essence an instance of (ii). If we make interpersonal comparisons on the basis of it, the 
underlying mechanism might be an informal instance of the account given in section 7.2. 
 
Of course, a psychological account of how we actually make (what look like) interpersonal 
comparisons of utility in everyday life is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the paper can be 
seen as presenting an existence argument, showing that interpersonal comparisons of utility are 
not in principle impossible, and clarifying the logical structure that evidence and auxiliary 
assumptions must have in order to provide a basis for interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
 
Indeterminacy does not imply impossibility, and even if we hold that interpersonal comparisons 
of utility are indeterminate, we do not need to claim that such comparisons cannot in principle be 
made. 
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